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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to

give the Appellant's requested jury instruction concerning
eyewitness identification?
2.

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction?
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
-vSTEPHEN JOHN KALISZ

Case No. 860032

Defendant/Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgement and conviction against
Stephen John Kalisz

for Aggravated Robbery, a felony of the First

Degree under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-203 (1953 as amended).

A jury

found the Appellant guilty following a trial held November 14 and
15, 1985, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge,
presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 17, 1985, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Appellants
John R. Remington, a dark-haired caucasion of medium-dark
complexion^ and another individual, possibly Stephen J. Kalisz, a
blond caucasion with a light complexion, arrived at Steve's Auto
Sales which is located at 860 South Main Street in Salt Lake City
(R.164-166).

Remington requested that he be allowed to test drive a

black 1978 Monte Carlo. (R.167).

Remington was allowed to test the vehicle without being ask^d for
identification (R.177).

While the two men tested the Monte Carlo

they left their unlocked truck with the owner of the car lot, Steve
Argyle (R.167).
After approximately 45 minutes, Mr. Argyle became concerned
that Mr. Remington had not returned with the Monte Carlo (R.163).
Argyle began a search of the truck they arrived in and discovered a
prison gate pass belonging to Mr. Remington (R.169,180).

He then

called the State Prison and the Salt Lake Police (R.169).
Officer James E. Faraone of the Salt Lake City Police
Department responded to the call for assistance (R.273).

After

listening to Argyle's story, the men together searched the

truck,

but could find no informative or incriminating evidence (R.290).
Officer Faraone then called in the license number of the truck
(R.171).

Shortly thereafter Mr. Kalisz returned with the Monte

Carlo (R.167,171,173,278).
While the car's owner suspected the window stickers had
been moved (R.172-3); the car was in good condition (R.192).

Since

Argyle had not checked the gas level or odometer reading before the
test drive, there was no way of knowing where the car had been
(R.180-81).

Kalisz was searched and even though no incriminating

evidence was discovered, he was detained by the police (R.174).
Later that evening, at approximately 7:45 p.m., Martin A.
Kaufman, a corrections supervisor at the State Prison, detained Mr.
Remii.gton as he re-entered the prison.

Remington was searched and

was found with only a watch, keys, keyring, and lighter (R.306).
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The corrections officer testified at trial that he was unaware of
what Remington had in his possession when he left the prison that
morning.

(R.311).
The record reveals that at approximately 5:20 p.m.* shortly

before Mr. Kalisz returned the Monte Carlo, a single, armed gunman
entered Cruser Jewelry, located in the Brickyard Plaza in Salt Lake
City (R.227).

The gunman ordered 78-year-old Reed Cruser, owner of

the store, into the bathroom and onto the floor (R.227).

The

perpetrator then took a large black garbage bag and stole most of
the jewelry from the store (R.227).
The record reveals that Mr. Cruser had only a few minutes
with which to view the gunman (R.236).

In fact, Cruser's view was

generally obstructed due to his position on the floor (R.236-37).
Cruser gave the police a general description of the gunman, noting
that he had "light" colored hair and a mustache (R.238-39).
Suspecting the caucasion Appellant Kalisz in the robbery, police
took Mr. Cruser to view the suspect soon after the crime (R.244).
Mr. Cruser failed to recognize Mr. Kalisz (R.283-84).
Mr. Remington and Mr. Kalisz were charged by information
with Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony.
(R.20-1).

(See Addendum A)

Mr. Remington was also charged with being in Possession

of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person and with being a
Habitual Criminal.
At the preliminary hearing, Reed Cruser described the
circumstances surrounding the robbery of his jewelry store (See
Addendum B).

After giving a description of the unknown gunman,
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Cruser then proceeded to identify defense co-counsel, Manny Garcia,
as the robber (See Addendum C, R.208,253).
At trial the State presented testimony from the used car
lot owner and from Mr. Cruser (R.164,222).

Salt Lake Police

Officers conceded that even though the gunman was not wearing gloves
(R.241) they were unable to obtain any fingerprints belonging to
either defendant (R.328-30).

A search of Kalisz revealed no stolen

jewelry (R.296-302) nor was any incriminating evidence discovered in
a search of his home (R.300).

Officers also conceded that no stolen

jewelry was found in the Monte Carlo (R.302), nor was the State ever
able to present any witness who saw the Monte Carlo or Mr. Kalisz at
the crime scene (Closing Transcript at 33-4).

In fact, the only

evidence placing either Remington or Kalisz at the Cruser Jewelry
Store was the testimony of the 78-year-old owner who mistakingly
selected co-counsel Manny Garcia as the unidentified robber.
Following the trial to the jury, both Appellants were found
guilty of Aggravated Robbery (R.374), and Mr. Remington was
subsequently guilty of Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a
Restricted Person (R.374) and of being a Habitual Criminal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Appellant, Stephen J. Kalisz, first contends that the
trial court erred in refusing to give a requested instruction on
eyewitness identification.

In light of the tenuous identification

by Mr. Cruser, the court abused its discretion in refusing such an
instruction.
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The Appellant* also argues that the evidence presented was
insufficient to sustain his conviction.

The evidence was not only

inconclusive, but it failed to implicate either man as committing
the robbery.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
REFUSING TO GIVE THE APPELLANT INSTRUCTION
CONCERNING IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY.
At the close of the defense, counsel for the Appellants
submitted a requested jury instruction on the reliability of
eyewitness identification presented at trial (See Addendum D)
(R.65-66).

The instruction was justified because the

misidentifications made by Reed Cruser rendered his testimony
questionable.

Since the eyewitness identifications compromised

almost all the proof given by the State against the defendants, the
defense argued that the instruction was crucial. (R.65-66).

The

trial court denied the requested instruction (R.66).
This Court in State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) and
State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618 (Utah 1969) held that a defendant in
a criminal case is entitled to have the jury instructed on his
theory of the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to support
that theory.

As noted in State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980),

the defendant's entitlement to a particular jury instruction is not
absolute.

Rather, it is conditioned upon the existence of evidence

supporting a theory before the instruction is warranted.

Where a

defendant has asserted a defense to justify or excuse a criminal
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charge and where there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to
support it, viability of the defense then becomes a question of fact
and the jury should be charged regarding it.
P.2d 33 (Utah 1981).

State v. Harding, 635

In instances where the refusal of a requested

instruction results in a compromise of the defendant's presumption
of innocence, the refusal is considered prejudicial.

United States

v. Greene, 591 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1979)> United States v. Telfaire,
469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Initially, the Appellant concedes that there is no
constitutional right or other requirement which presently exists
«

that mandates a trial court to instruct juries on the inherent
fallibility of eyewitness identification in all cases.

In fact,

this Court in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982), left the
decision of whether or not to read the Telfaire-type instruction to
the jury in the discretion of the trial court..

See also:

State v.

Mcclain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985)* State v. Watson, 684 P.2d 39
(Utah 1984); State v. Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1984).
However, showing greater sensitivity to problems inherent
in eyewitness identification, this Court abandoned the discretionary
standard in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).

There the

Court noted the dangers in eyewitness identifications, concluding:
We therefore today abandon our discretionary
approach to cautionary jury instructions and
direct that in cases tried from this date
forward, trial courts shall give such an
instruction whenever eyewitness identification is
a central issue in a case and such an instruction
is requested by the defense. Given the great
weight jurors are likely to give eyewitness
testimony, and the deep and generally unperceived
flaws in it, to convict a defendant on such
evidence without advising the jury of the factors
that should be considered in evaluating it could
well deny the defendant due process of law under
article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
Id. at 492.
—
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In fact, even before this Court's decision in Long, courts
across the country called for cautionary instructions regarding
eyewitness identifications.

As the court noted in United States v.

Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 552:
The presumption of innocence that safeguards the
common law system must be a premise that is
realized in instruction and not merely a
promise. In pursuance of that objective, we have
pointed out the importance of and need for
special instruction on the key issue of
identification, which emphasizes to the jury the
need for finding that the circumstances of the
identification are convincing beyond a reasonable
doubt.
While courts are divided as to whether to require the
Telfaire-type instruction, movement clearly seems to be toward the
giving of the instruction.

Both the Seventh and Fourth Circuits

have strongly recommended' the use of Telfaire instructions in cases
where identification is a key issue.

See United States v. Hodges,

515 F.2d 650 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273
(4th Cir. 1974).

Approval of the instruction has been made in

numerous states, including Utah, under certain conditions. See
State v. Malmrose, supra? State v. Warren, 635 P.2d 1236 (Kansas
1981); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 391 N.E.2d 889 (Mass. 1979); State
v. Benjamin, 363 A.2d 726 (Conn. Supp. 1976); State v. Calica, 514
P.2d 1354 (Or. App. 1973), cert, denied, 417 U.S.^917 (1974).
In Utah, support for giving a Telfaire instruction has even
been advanced by the State in oral arguments before this Court in
State v. Quevedo, Utah Supreme Court Jo. 19049 (argued November 14,
1985), and in State v. Jonas, Utah Supreme Court No. 20184 (argued
November 15, 1985).

As the State noted in Quevedo:
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"If the State's case is based primarily on
eyewitness identification testimony, then in most
cases a Telfaire-type instruction should be
given." Quevedo, Oral Argument (11/14/86).
In fact, the State in Jonas actually encouraged this Court to adopt
a standard mandating the instruction be given in appropriate cases,
noting:
"A standard which would require the giving of a
Telfaire-type of instruction in cases which are
primarily based upon eyewitness identification
would be a clear guide to the trial court and a
clear guide to the State and to defense counsel
as to when these types of instructions were
appropriate."
Jonas, Or^l Argument (11/15/86).

The State indicated in Jonas that

its position was changed because of the number of appeals generated
by this Court's current discretionary review standards and because
"[T]he literature on this'subject weighs in favor of this type of
instruction and can really only help the truth finding process in a
criminal case."

Id.

This Court, in spite of the confusion over when to give the
Telfaire instruction, has on numerous occasions found error in a
trial court's refusal to give the instruction but upheld convictions
on other grounds.

See State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833 (Utah 1984) (No

error when witness had ample time to view suspect under ideal
conditions)? State v. Watson, supra, (No error when instruction
particularly addressed weaknesses which defendant raised in trial)j
State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984) (No error since requested
instruction adequately covered in other instructions); State v.
Malmrose, supra.

(No error where defense counsel failed to take

exception to the trial court's refusal to give the instruction).
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Under the facts of this case, however, the Court is presented with a
situation in which the trial court abused its discretion by refusing
to give the Telfaire-type instruction which is now mandated by
Long,
At the close of the case there was virtually no evidence
presented by the State other than the identifications made by Mr.
Cruser which placed either Mr. Remington or Mr. Kalisz at the crime
scene.

There were no photographs, no fingerprints, no other

customers or eyewitnesses observing the unknown robber entering or
leaving tehe store.

(R.241,290,300,302,328-30). The gun alleged to

have been used by the robber was also not presented at trial.
The eyewitness identification of Reed Cruser can only be
characterized as confusing Mr. Cruser, the victim of the robbery,
gave a general description of the robber to police immediately after
the crime which included the fact that the robber had light-colored
hair (R.226,239).

Shortly after the robbery, Mr. Cruser was taken

to Steve's Auto Sales to view Stephen Kalisz to see if Kalisz could
be identified as the perpetrator.

At trial Cruser testified that he

did identify Mr. Kalisz as the robber at the car lot
(R.244,245,247).

However, a police officer who was present at this

show-up stated that Cruser did not identify Mr. Kalisz
(R.283,284,289,290).

A few days after the robbery, Mr. Cruser was

shown a photo spread by police.

From the photo spread, Mr. Cruser

selected a picture of John Remington and identified him as the
person who robbed his store (R.326).

At trial Cruser reaffirmed

that the man in the picture (Remington) was the robber, (R.228-229);
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however, when asked to make an in-court identification of the
robber, Cruser apparently identified Mr. Kalisz (R.202,
246,247,248,278).

Indeed, at the preliminary hearing, Cruser was

not able to identify either defendant and identified only court
personnel (R.208,253,259,271). In fact perhaps all of Mr. Cruser's
identification testimony can best be summarized by his admission at
one point that he was uncertain as to the robber's identity
(R.246).
Given the obvious conflicts with the testimony of the
State's key witness coupled with that person's age and partially
obstructed view during the robbery (R.236,237,243,257,263,267), the
trial court should have given the requested instruction concerning
eyewitness identification.
mandatory under Long.

The instruction would have been

However, even under the pre-Long

discretionary standard, the trial court abused its discretion by not
giving the instruction because of the ambiguities of the
identification testimony.
Clearly, here this Court is confronted with a situation
where a Telfaire type instruction was not only warranted, but quite
possibly crucial in determining the ultimate outcome of the trial.
As noted by the State in Jonas, the instruction, if given, would
have stated "what the jurors ought to look for in a given case to
determine whether or not the identification is or is not reliable."
Without the instruction there is a clear possibility that the
Appellant was denied his presumption of innocence by assigning undue
weight to the eyewitness testimony.
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This Court should be especially sensitive to the situation
given the State's position in Quevedo that "the State cannot really
come up with a compelling answer why Telfaire ought not be given
rather routinely in cases that depend to a large extent on
eyewitness identification."

In this case the failure of the trial

court was particularly prejudicial and warrants reversal.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION.
The Appellant was found guilty at trial of Aggravated
Robbery, a felony of the first degree under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302
(1953 as amended).

He now argues that the State produced

insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction and now requests a
reversal of that conviction.
To convict the Appellant of the crime charged, the
prosecution must have introduced evidence sufficient to eliminate
all reasonable doubts as to his inocence from the minds of the
jurors.

This basic standard is codified in Utah Code Ann.

76-1-501

(1953 as amended), which states:
A defendant in a criminal proceeding
to be innocent until each element of
charged against him is proved beyond
doubt. In absence of such proof, the
shall be acquitted.

is presumed
the offense
a reasonable
defendant

In State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980), Justice
Maughan, dissenting, addressed this undisputed standard with regard
to sufficiency arguments, concluding

-11-

This standard provides the basis for appellate
review of a jury's verdict. While it is the sole
province of the jury to assess the credibility of
the various witnesses and determine the weight of
the evidence, this Court must review the
.sufficiency of the evidence upon which the jury
bases its final determination. If the evidence
presented is so lacking that no reasonable person
could conclude it eliminates all reasonable doubt
of the defendant's guilt then we must set aside
the jury verdict.
Id. at 232.
Consequently, if there is any reasonable view of the
credible evidence which is consistent with the Appellant's
innocence, it would follow that there would be reasonable doubts as
to his guilt.

In this case, since all charges stem from a single

criminal episode, the prosecution must have proven that on or about
August 17, 1985, the Appellant either attempted to commit or did
commit a robbery of Cruser Jewelry and that he did so intentionally
or knowingly with the use of a deadly weapon.
This Court has addressed sufficiency of evidence
requirements on numerous occasions.

In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d

443 (Utah 1983), the Court considered whether there was sufficient
evidence to sustain a jury conviction of the crime of second degree
murder.

Mr. Petree claimed the State failed to prove he

"intentionally and knowingly" caused the death of the victim.

In

considering the appropriate standard of review, this Court stated,
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbably that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted,
(citations omitted)
Id. at 444.
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While recognizing that certain deference be granted to the
jury verdict, the Court nevertheless cautioned that,
In fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence
and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict, the reviewing court will stretch the
evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But
this does not mean that the court can take a
speculative leap across a remaining gap in order
to sustain a verdict. The evidence, stretched to
is utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
(citations omitted)
Id. at 445.

In the present case, the failure of the State to prove

any essential element beyond a reasonable doubt means this Court
must reverse.

State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48,51 (Utah 1983).

The only substantive evidence against Stephen Kalisz in
this case is the fact that he returned the car which John Remington
had originally taken for a test drive (R.172,276-279).

However,

officers at the scene searched Mr. Kalisz and found no stolen
property (R.283).

A search of the vehicle which Mr. Kalisz returned

also provided no evidence of criminal activity (R.302).

Indeed, a

search of Mr. Kaliszfs residence also produced nothing to implicate
him in the robbery of Cruserfs jewelry (R.300).
While the store owner, Reed Cruser, stated that he
identified Mr. Kalisz shortly after the robbery as the perpetrator
(R.244-247), an officer at the scene stated unequivocally that no
such identification was made by Cruser (R.283-284).

Cruser stated

that the robber wore a light blue stocking cap and sweater, tan
pants, and gym shoes (R.226)j yet within only minutes of the robbery
and several miles away, officers stated that Mr. Kalisz was dressed

-13-

in a light blue shirt and blue levis or corduroy pants and was
wearing boots (R.280).

The only other witness who testified to

seeing either defendant at any time close to the crime testified
that Mr. Kalisz was not the man she saw (R.215-219).

Indeed, Mr.

Cruser himself later picked a picture of John Remington not Stephen
Kalisz as the person who robbed the jewelry store (R.326).
In summary, no substantive evidence produced at trial
linked Stephen Kalisz to the robbery of Cruser Jewelry.

The only

undisputed evidence linking Mr. Kalisz to the events of August 17,
1985 concerned his return of the vehicle to the used car lot.

This

evidence can in no way support a conviction for aggravated robbery.
The Court is left with only speculation as to why Mr. Kalisz was
convicted and, as this Court has stated, mere speculation is
insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction.

CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant,
Stephen Kalisz, asks this Court to reverse his conviction and remand
his case to the lower court for either dismissal of the charges or a
new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

) y day of September, 1986.

% .

MANNY GARCZA
Attorney for Appellant
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four copies of the above Appellant's
Brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this

TV* day of

September, 1986.

MA&NY GA$CIA
Attorney for Appellant
Delivered by

this

September, 1986.
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ADDENDUM A

T.L. 'TED'" CANtfnv
County Attorney
By: DAVID S. WALSH
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Screened by:
Assigned to:

THE STATE OF UTAH,

D S Walsh
D S Walsh

Plaintiff,
BAIL

A§B NO BAIL

v.
INFORMATION
JOHN R. REMINGTON
STEPHEN J. KALISZ

DOB 08/26/57,
DOB 0*T/17/56,

Criminal No.

1S0

8 5FS «

Defendant(s).

The undersigned Don Bell - SLCPD under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of:
COUNT i'
AGGRAVAJED ROBBERY, a First Degree Felony, at 1140 Brickyard, in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about August 17, 1985, in
^
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 302, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, JOHN R.
y*
REMINGTON and STEPHEN J. KALISZ, as parties to the offense,
/V
unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in the
3
possession of Reed Cruser from the person or immediate
0
presence of Reed Cruser, against his will, by the use of a
firearm or a facsimile of a firearm;

?

COUNT II
POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Second
Degree Felony, at 1140 Brickyard, in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, on or about August 17, 1985, in violation of Title
76, Chapter 10, Section 503, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, JOHN R. REMINGTON, a party
to the offense, did have in, ''his- possession a dangerous
weapon, to-wit:
a / firearm, while an inmate at the Utah
Of*? ;.:/
State Prison;

y
%i

(Continued on page Two)

-^7/

J

INFORMATION
STATE v. JOHN R. REMINGTON and STEPHEN J. KALISZ
County Attorney #85-1-67290
Page Two
COUNT III
POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY RESTRICTED PERSON, a Second
Degree Felony, at 1140 Brickyard, in Salt Lake County, State
y
of Utah, on or about August 17, 1985, in violation of Title
76, Chapter 10, Section 503, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, STEPHEN__J_. KALIS.Z. a party
to the offense, did have in his possession a dangerous
weapon, to-wit: a firearm, while on parole for a felony;
COUNT IV
HABITUAL
yy
•*

CRIMINAL, a First Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, on or about August 17, 1985, in vioLation of Title
76, Chapter 8, Section 1001, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant,
MINGTON, a party
to the offense, committed the First Degree Felony charged in
Count I above, and was then and there a person who had been
twice convicted, sentenced and committed for felony offenses
at least one of which offenses having been at least a felony
of the Second Degree, and was committed to prison, to-wit:

CASE #
#CR81-332

CHARGE/DEGREE
Agg Robbery/lst

JUDGE/CO
Judge Dee
SL Dist Ct

T7TT/81

SENTENCE
5 to Life

#CR31541

Theft by
Deception/3rd

Judge Croft
SL Dist Ct

3/20/81

0 to 5

#CR31359
#CR31541

Assault by
Prisoner/3rd

Judge Croft
SL Dist Ct

1-31-78

0 to 5

DATE

*titr
NO BAIL REQUEST:

The defendant JOHN R. REMINGTON is currently an
inmate at the Utah State Prison for another felony.
Therefore,
pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Utah Constitution, it is requested
that the defendant be held without bail on the above charge.
NO BAIL REQUEST: The defendant STEPHEN J. KALISZ is currently on
parole from the Utah State Prison for another felony.
Therefore,
puuuaiii
«.u MiLiv-ic
pursuant to
Article I±, Section 8, Utah Constitution, it is requested
that the defendant be held without bail on the above charge.
(Continued on page Three)

<K

c^iq^d^

d'V'Tf

o-SYh

n.u

ADDENDUM B

DIRECT

ttXAMlNA'JL'lUIN

Q.

Would you state your name please sir?

A.

Reed Cruser.

Q.

How do you spell uour last name?

A.

Cruser.

Q.

And where are you employed Mr. Curser?

A.

Sir, my hearing is not the best —

Q.

As what?

A.

Jeweler and watchmaker.

Q.

Where?

A,

At 1140 East Brickyard Road.

Q.

Is that located here in Salt Lake City?

I am self-employed.

A. Yes.
Q.

And within the town. Were you thus employed on or about August 17,

of this year?
A.

Yes, I was in my store.

Q.

And on that date, a were you held up?

A. Yes.
Q.

Would you tell the Court about that please?

A.

It was about 5:30 and I was sitting at my watch bench, I have a

little bell that rings there but I just didn't hear this man came in
in a real hurrv and wheeled around the corner and held the gun on me.
Q.

Ok, would you describe to the Judge, that gun please?

A.

A, probably about as near as I could tell it was a black gun and I

would say as near as I know an automatic and probably 22 or 25 calibur.
Q.

Now do you see that man here in the court today?

A.

Well, I can't say for sure, maybe its dressed different.

Q.

What was

the difference in dress ?

A.

Well when he came in he had a I guess they call them the ski maskf

it was a sweater, it looked like a heavy knit thing that pulls down over
his head.
Q.

How far over his head?

A,

Well, just above his eyes as near as I could tell.

Q.

Did he speak to you?

A.

Yes, he told me back up there and he said get in here, he was going

to put me in the restroom, he saya no you get out here and you lay
down on the floor,
Q.

What happened then?

A.

Well he just cleared out my safe, he asked where the diamonds were

I told him I didn't have diamonds and a, I asked him if he not take the
customers repairs I said you won't get anything out of those anyway
but he just cleaned everything out of the safe; took all the drawers out
and dumped them in a black plastic bag, went over to one of the show
casas_and_Jie knew right where the money I had to make change was that
was the only drawer that he took and a, he scooped watches out of that
case.
Q.

What kind of watches did he take sir?

A.

Well, there was Boulliva, Carvell, Citizen and my own name on Reeds

I have (inaudible)
Q.

Where is that located?

A.

There a, I buy these from the East and had my own name put on them

here ^nd they use that brand name that is done by many jewelers put
their own name on them,
Q.

How long was he in your store sir?

A.

Well I would say just about three to five minutes.

Q.

Not on tape

A.

I called the police department, I run next door to a man and asked

him to this guy turned to the right which is the west of the store and
I run to this man just two doors east and asked him to watch for this
guy and see if he could get a license plate, but anyway he run to the
west and then there is an openning there so I am sure he went out that
way.
Q.

Now the person that you think is that person would you tell us where

that person is sitting and what he is wearing?
A.

What he is wearing today, now?

The man over here kind of was looked

like, this man is to dark here, his complexion, but tfre man over here
would look like like him.
Q.

Now were you shown a photospread sir after this?

A.

Would you please repeat?

Q.

Yes sir, were you shown a photospread a, of people by the detectives?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And were you able to pick out the person who did it?

A.

Yes.

Q.

How certain were you at that time that the person in the photo you

identified was the person you —
A.

Well, they took me up to identify the man, they had him in the car

he was dressed, of conrspf rH ffpfgnt-. h^ h^H black boots on and I don't
know-~abau£__the rest of what he was wearing, but it was different, ~~v_
the blacJc boots__hacL,heels about 2-2% inches high.
Q.

Where did they take you to do this sir?

A.

Oh let's see I believe it was about 8th South across from Sears

of somewhere there I think the police have a place there.

Q.

And were you able to identify him at that time?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that the person?

A.

That was the person.

Q.

No further questions your Honor.
Khris Harold's

CROSS EXAMINATION

Q.

Mr. Cruser how long total

was this man in your store?

A.

How long was he in the store?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Well I would say just about three to five minutes.

Q.

Ok, how much of that time were you able to look at his face?

A.

Well,„a Little-bit-I- didn f t look to much at him because he told me

Total.

to turn around and lay flat on the floor.
Q.

Were you able to ascertain what color his hair was?

A.

It was sort of a brownish rT>lnr_ as near as I could tell.

Q.

What about height sir, what height would you say he was?

A.

Approximately 5'10".

Q.

Could you give me an approximate weight of this individual?

A.

Well, I thought probably 170 lbs.

Q.

Would you describe that as an average size build for a man that

height?
A.

Well, as far as I know I have never paid too much attention to those

things.
Q.

Do you recall anything else this individual was wearing beside the

ski mask or ski hat down just above the eye, anyother article of clothing?
A.

Well, the pants when it was a sort of a tan pants and he had gymn

shoes on and then the sweater and cap to match which was looked liked
a knit Jheavy Jsweater ana cap.

when he spoke to you?
A.

No, not that I can just recall.

I thought he first came in a little

earlier in the day and—a^kad to see some chain, he saw a heavy rope
chain, which of course, was gold filled and also he mentioned something
about wanting to buy some watches for a brother-in-law or some relative
getting married and I showed him a particular one a his and hers, urn
Citizen watch, but he wanted to look at some others and looked at some
more expensive

numbers I had in the case.

Q.

How much earlier in the day was this?

A.

A, I couldn't say sometime after noon, it was I don't know exactly

between,_maybe 12:00 and 2:00.

I didn't pay too much attention to that

at that time.
Q.

How was the person dressed at that time?

A.

Well I didn't notice too much in his dress, I didn't have any reason

to look him over or anything.
Q.

Anything that you recall though, any detail?

A.

Not - I did notice him hawing * fKfarhp and a, this man that came

in and kind of brown hair.

I would say possibly a slim type (fact)not

heavy or anything that way.
Q.

And how long was he in the store that first time earlier when he

was looking at your watches?
A.

Oh, very short I don't think over five minutes, he asked me to put

some of that stuff on Uvawav

and he mentioned that the wedding wouldn't

be for sometime.
Q.

But he didn't actually make any purchases at that time?

A.

No, he asked if he could put it on layaway.

Q.

And then he left?

A.

Oh he was going to bring his wift back.

Q.

I have nothing further.

Manny Garciafs

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Q.

Mr. Cr\iserf is it Cruser?

A.

Cruser, yes

Q.

Now you were taken by the police to a car lot after you were robbed

and shown somebody is that right?
A.

Well, it was somewhere I thought on South State; I wasn't to sure

of the location I thought it might be across from Sears, somewhere in
that
Q.

—
But the police took you over there and told you that they had a

suspect?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And when you arrived there there was a man there for you to look at?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was it this man here?

A.

No I don't think so.

Q.

Have you ever seen this man in the cache outfit here before?

A.

Well, I don't know as

Q.

Ok, but you are sure that he is not the man that they showed you

TJWP1.1.!^

rQ

cognise him.

at the South State?
A. -Different—man—I—think. At least the mustache, I can't see whether
he is wearing one or not.
Q.

Did the robber have a dark mustache?

A.

Yes, Vinr^nf a ^rnwnish mustache to match the hair,

Q.

Can you state with certainity sir, this is-not the man that robbed you?

This man right here?
A.

As far as I know—cu^

Q.

Ok, the man that you sawT that the police showed you had on big black

boots?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And at that time did you tell the police that that was the man that

robbed you?
A.

I said yes< it looks to me like that is the guy, only he is dressed

different now.
Q.

A, meaning that the boots are different.

A.

The boots, he wore gymn shoes, I had a chance to see those when I

was laying on the floor, he had me face down but he asked for the diamonds
and I noticed the pants and the qymn shoes.
Q.

The pants were different sir?

A.

The pants were a light tan, kind of a tan.

Q.

And what color were the robbers pants in the store?

A.

They were tan,

well now you asked that question twice now, did you

mean in the store?
Q.

Well, ok the man that you saw, the police showed you to, the man

at the car lot with the boots on, were the pants he had on different
then than the pants
A.

—

I think they were, I didn't notice that too much, but I did nnt-ir^

the boots there he has on.
Q.

When this man pulled that ski mask over his head you could still see

his eyes couldn't you?
A.

Well, I think he come in he didn't have it, he had it pulled down

when he come in enough to hide his hair, his head.
Q.

But could you see his^eye"^?)

A.

I didn't notice that.

Q.

Ok, did you notice any/ marks or tatoos or anything on him?

Q.

Did a, this man that you went two doors and asked if he saw anything

did he say that he saw anybody?
A.

No, he a I guess he run around the corner I haven't talked to him--

too much about that but I am sure he didn't because he went the other
way, I thought possibly he might have a car parked down there but I'm
sure when he went out to the west and then oh another 100 ft. or so
there is another openning there to the west so I assume that that is the
way he went out.
Q.

Did you go out that door?

A.

I didn't go because I called the police and waited and locked up the

door so no one could get in and disturb any evidence.
Q. Ok, did this robber have gloves on ?
A.

Didn't notice any gloves.

Q.

Ok, urn, what parts of your store did he touch besides the jewelery

case?
A.

Well the safe and the jewelery case and the windows.

Q.

Ok, Now you are quite certain then that you told the police that

the man they were showing you on the Street was the man who robbed you?
A.

Yes.

Q.

But you a>re saying now that it was certainly not this man?

A.

Well, I couldn't say, the build is about right.

Q.

What about the mustache?

A.

Well, he had a mustache, I believe, at first I didn't know, but then

when I got to t h i n k i n I connected t h i s with the^^iLJLii-ja.arliRr -in.JJie
s t o r e , he did have a mustache, i t seemed l i k e darker than what I see
there.
Q.

Ok, and the difference in the clothing?

A.

Well, I didn't notice too much about the clothing I was more intereste

in looking at his face and then I did notice the boots that he had on
he wasn't dressed that way.
Q.

Ok, I believe that is all I have.
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THE C O U R T :
BE MI S 1 DEIITI F I E D

3

WE D O N ' T

Q

5

PHOTOGRAPHS

6

A

8

ME WHAT

9

BE S U R E

LOOK

Q

HE

AT T H E S E .

AND SOMETIMES

WAS THERE

GENTLEMEN

11

MIGHT

WHOSE

HAVE

ANY

SAID?

SOMETIMES

YOU WILL

INDICATION

PICTURES

WERE

YOU

BE S U R E .

TELL

WITH

SHOWN

ANY OF

THESE

OF H O W T A L L

THEY

BEEN?

12

A

NO .

13

Q

D I D A L L OF T H E S E

14

A

NOT THAT

16

Q

DO Y O U K N O W

17

A

NO .

18

Q

WOULD

19

WHAT

YOU THINK .

10

15

WHEN HE BROUGHT THE

IN, DO Y O U R E C A L L

HE S A I D ,

WON'T

TO

THANK' Y O U .

(BY MS. HARROLD)

7

MR. GARCIA

AGAIN.

MR. GARCIA:

4

WANT

GENTLEMEN

I CAN R E C A L L ,

HAVE

BUT MOST

MUSTACHES?
OF

THEM

DID .

AND TELL

YOU MIND

ME H O W M A N Y

20

A

SURE.

21

0

HOW MANY

22

PHOTOS

23

A

NONE

24

Q

ARE THOSE

25

WORDS,

HAVE

HOW

LOOKING

HAVE

OF

THROUGH

THOSE

NOW

MUSTACHES?

A L L OF THEM
OF T H O S E

SUNGLASSES

ARE THEY

MANY?

DO.
GENTLEMEN

IN

THOSE

ON?

THEM.
ALL DIRECT

LOOKING

RIGHT

SHOTS?
AT THE

IN O T H E R
CAMERA?
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1

BUILD

AS

THE

ROBBER?

2

A

PRETTY

NEAR.

3

Q

A SLIM

PERSON?

4 I

A

SIR?

5

Q

A SLIM

6

A

WELL,

7

Q

SO,

8

HEARING

WHEN

9

YOU,

FACT,

IN

11

Q

DO

THE

NOT

15

Q

DO YOU

LIGHT

BROWN

18

Q

HOW

19

A

WELL,

70, JUST
Q

BAG

AT THE

NO.

PRELIMINARY

IDENTIFICATIONS

THAT

YOU WERE

ME AT

ASKED

THE

IF YOU

SAW

A

DID

IN HI S

I RECALL.
SAYING

THE

MAN

IN

THE

SUIT?

I DON'T

22

SET,

IDENTIFYING

REMEMBER

A

21

NEAR.

ME?

WHEN

THAT

17

OR

PRETTY

ROBBER?
A

20

MAKING

REMEMBER

HEARING

HEAVY

REMEMBER

WERE

YOU

14

16

REAL

IDENTIFIED

SIR?

13

WASN'T

YOU

A

SAY

PERSON?

DO YOU

10

12 I P R E L I M I N A R Y

I WOULD

KNOW

MUCH

DO

YOU

THAT
YOU

ARE

I MENTIONED

THINK

PRETTY

JT AT

I WEIGH,
NEAR

--

ALL.

SIR?

I WOULD

160

GUESS.
THIS

ROBBER

WALK

IN WITH

NOTICE

THAT

UNTIL

THAT

PLASTIC

HANDS?

23

A

I DIDN'T

24

Q

DID

25

A

I KNEW

YOU

SEE W H E R E
HE WAS

HE

FILLING

HE W E N T

OUT.

WENT?
SOMETHING

THERE
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ADDENDUM D

INSTRUCTION NO.

Identification testimony is an expression of belief or
impression by the witness.

In this case its value depends on

the opportunity the witness had to observe whether or not the
defendant was the person who is charged with the alleged
crime.
In appraising the identification testimony of a witness,
you should consider the following:
1.

Are you convinced that the witness had the capacity

and an adequate opportunity to observe the offender?
Whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe
the person at the time will be affected by such matters as how
long or short a time was available, how far or close the witness
was from the offender, how good were lighting conditions,
whether the witness had had occasion to see or know the person
in the past.
2.

Are you satisfied that the identification made by that

witness subsequent to the event was a product of his or her
own recollection?

You may take into account both the strength

of the identification, and the circumstances under which the
identification was made.
If the identification by the witness may have been influenced
by the circumstances under which the defendant was presented
to him for identification, you should scrutinize the identification
with great care.

You may also consider the length of time that

lapsed between the occurence of the crime and the next
opportunity of the witness to see defendant, as a factor beari^g.N*

INSTRUCTION NO.
Page 2

on the reliability of the identification.
3.

Finally, you must consider the credibility of each

identification witness in the same way as any other witness,
consider whether he is truthful, and consider whether he had
the capacity and opportunity to make a reliable observation
on the matter covered in his testimony.
The burden of proof on the State extends to every element
of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is such an
element.

The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

John R. Remington was the perpetrator of the offense.

If

after examining the testimony, you have a reasonable doubt as
the accuracy of the identification you must find the defendant
not guilty.
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